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paper, dealing with statutory, administrative and contractual aspects of 
Dot icy on foreign African labour supply to South Africa, examines six inter-
related issues: 
a
 (
> the concept and definition of foreign or alien African workers; 
*b; the re:?-: ^twsen policy and social and economic requirements of tha 
state; 
[c] tne va-ioJS fcrms of existing policy, 
;d5 the "iccislhticr governing foreign workers in South Africa; 
;e) the historical and contractual conditions of inter-state agreements, firstly 
w> :<• -e^rence to existing suppliers and then with respect to previous or 
prospective suppliers; and 
(f) various ^/nditionciL elements which help to define policy as implemented 
in its statutory, administrative and contractual forms. 
THE CONCEPT AND DEFINITION OF FOREIGN OR ALIEN AFRICAN WORKERS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
A foreign African worker is generally understood in South Africa to be a 
worker born outside of Sojth Africa and Namibia/South West Africa. However, even 
this requires qualification in the light of the Status of Tranakei Act of 1976, 
the coming independence of Namibia and some existing measures designed to exclude 
from certain regulations those aliens who were living and/or working in South 
Africa before 1 July 1963. 
The approach to foreign workers has become more sharply exclusive in recent 
years. The Froneman Committee, which inquired into foreign workers in South 
Africa in 1961/2, expressed many of the fears of officials 1n respect of 
foreign African workers.
1
 It cited reasons for identifying and excluding 
foreigners (unless in South Africa for contract or temporary work) and it 
advocated their forced repatriation together with their dependent women and 
children, the objective being the systematic replacement of foreign African 
men in employment. A major constraint was thought to be the estimated level 
of unemployment of local African workers in South Africa (then believed to be 
low). But it was argued that substitution of foreign by domestic Africans 
could help to diminish dependence on uncertain foreign supplies. 
/The realisation 
"he -eal i s?.t i on of a grovi.'ic labour surplus in the South African economy has 
sj^secjently Drought more support for this substitution which appears to 
have the implication of solving both (some of) the unemployment problem as 
well as c.opinc, with the problem of continued dependence on foreign labour. 
ThdS fewer concessions has'e been allowed foreign workers in general; and 
conscious moves to replace foreign with local workers have been encouraged 
at local labour bureau level and in terms of national labour policy. 
THE RELATION OF POLICY i'O ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REQUIREMENTS 
Policy on foreign African labour supply may be almost wholly related to the 
collectively-assessed needs of employers within a context of securing a low-
cost and relatively secure source of (mostly) unskilled labour, notably for 
primary industries. There also exist a set of social requirements, e.g. the 
need for domestic stabilisaiion in the short-term and long run. In part, of 
late, this has been achieved, or at least sought, by means of adjustment to 
foreign labour supply volume and composition, the express purpose being to 
diminish growing local unemployment.
2
>
 3 
Changes in state foreign African labour policy to meet changing broad economic 
and social needs mainly appear firstly in administrative form. Changes to 
legislation and re-negotiation of inter-state contracts, or their abrogation 
usually take much longer. Of course, statutory and contractual conditions 
normally define the limits within which administrative regulation takes place. 
EXPRESSIONS OF POLICY: VARIOUS FORMS 
A number of forms may be used to give articulation to policy. Here concern is 
primarily with the policy of the recipient state - South Africa. This policy 
may be mediated or qualified by tendencies or policies of various employers re-
presenting different branches of capital as well as compromises secured by 
supplier states or other interest groups through negotiation or pressure. 
A notable absentee amongst the latter has been and remains unionised or organ-
ised African labour. This, however, is one of the typical structural features 
of the foreign labour supply pattern. 
/The principal 
Tiie principal for:is of policy to be distinguished are the legislative, the 
contractual a d the administrative. They may be operative at different levels 
of the state system or over different phases in the articulation of a specified 
policy. Major problems of management of the state apparatus involve not only 
shaping policy in the direction of specified group interests, but also 
realising it in the various mechanisms at the disposal of those charged with 
controlling the political system. Thus, it may be that at certain junctures 
some contradictory components are to be found between different forms of policy, 
if not in implementation,then in rfe jure enunciation. However, over a longer-
term period, these ma.y be expected to be eliminated, given a modicum of 
sys i cms efficiency. 
It l:> thus possible to view administrative changes or new amendments to 
legislation as precursors of the longer-term policies embodied in inter-state 
contracts or agreements on the question of (foreign African) labour supply. 
The choice of mechanism of implementation of new policy may itself be dependent 
on political-economic considerations. 
LEGISLATION GOVERN IN-j. FOREIGN AFRICAN WORKERS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
It has been through legislative definition that foreign or alien Africans (and 
African workers) have become so classified for the purposes of policy. Legis-
lation has also defined the requirements of entry, work securement arid eventual 
departure.
u 
The first systematic controls over foreign African workers were expressed in the 
Native Labour Regulations Act No. 15 of 1911. This was soon followed by the 
Admission of Persons to the Union Regulation Act No. ?2 of 1913 (revised as 
Act 59 of 1972). it t'efined classes of persons who are prohibited immigrants. 
This definition included persons deemed by the Minister of the Interior on 
economic grounds or on account of standards or habit of life to be unsuited 
for entry. Ti.is was re-affirmed in the Aliens Act No. 1 of 1937. 
MCit foreign African.-, were defined as, and today are considered as, prohibited 
immigrants because: (a) they are unable, by reason of deficient education 
/(i.e. a Standard VII 
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(i.e. a Standard VII Certificate) to read and write a European language;-
(b) they lack means of support and could oecome a public charge; (c) they 
previously entered without acceptable passports. Foreign ru'.u'ant workers 
may be exempt from these disqualifications and thereby enter South Africa 
provided they: (a) enter a service contract wit!' an employer; (b) they 
leave the country at expiration of contract without cost to the state. In 
addition, migrants may enter South Africa under the terms of a specific 
inter-state agreement. 
Further Acts of relevance, which will not be detailed here, include the 
following: Bantu Labour Regulations Act No. 67 of 1945; Bantu (Urban Areas) 
Consolidation Art No. 25 of 1945; Departure From The Union Regulations Act 
No. of 1955; the Bantu (Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents) 
Act No. 67 of 1952; the Border Control P e t No. 61 of 1967; and the Bantu 
Taxation Act No. 92 of 1969. Regulations made under these Acts must also be 
taken into account. 
Inter alia, these Acts in effect keep foreign workers out of certain defined 
areas, except under exemptions. In this way, foreign labour is made supple-
mentor:/ to local labour. The legislation also defines the work options 
allowed foreign African workers, applies restrictions on their entry into the 
Western Cape and most urban areas, while it also excludes employment in. domestic 
work in mr.ny areas. Significantly, it also prohibits permanent migration and 
migration with families. Under it, foreign workers may not become tenants 
in urban areas. Clandestine migration is forbidden, and Lermination of service 
is defined as a condition leading r.eccssarily to repatriation. 
Whilst workers are in employment, most labour 'legislation generally applicable 
to South Africa as a whole also applies to foreign Africans, e.g. the 
Pneumoconiosis Act No. 57 of 1956 and Workmen's Cementation Act No. 30 of 
1941. Howeverj the Unemployment Act does not apply: nor do any 
statutory pension arrangements. The indirect costs of labour associated 
with these latter components and the cost of reproduction of labour are ex-
plicitly shifted onto supplier states. 
/The rationale 
o^a
1
 e for existing legislation h3S been outlined by Breytenbach who 
rctes. as • f it were a virtue in itself, that, it enables the state to 'mobilise 
toe labour force.
1
' Th^s is i.-r»OvX«bt»?dly an understatement, since the enforced 
•rob
1
 : i :y bidden and cost? pi on foreign worker's is e n o m o u s . But the 
~'jrthe>' rationalisation offered by the same author is little short of dis-
^ngensoos, •... *
;
;at it ' protect (s) the unskilled indigenous (rural or urban) 
:abejrer acainst r.ier. c u t;; >e 11 lion on the labour market and (it) forces the 
foreig
n
 wcrKprs to do fuil-iiT.e work and therefore safeguard(s) him from 
expi-lsion and from socioeconomic problems such as unenijjl oyment and subsequent 
loss ot income and arcoirrsoc- . o - '
 s
 As will be argued, other reasons and 
interests account for the exist once, form and changes in "legislation and 
policy applicable to foreign AT; : :an workers in South Africa. 
HISTORICAL AND CONTRACTUAL ASf-'tliS Of INI LK-STATE AGREEMENTS 
Tne largest number of foreign African migrant labourer's enter South Africa under 
expl icit inter-state agreement:-, between South Africa and supplier states. These 
agreements date from 1928, the time of the Mocambique Convention. Prior to 
this,aarranqements were made direct/ly between private recruiters and supplier 
states 
As of the middle of 1977, agreements existed in both dc jure and de facto terms 
with Mozambique, the BL.S states and Zimbabwe. Do jure agreement existed with 
Malawi and Angola: since 19/4 and 1973 respectively, these agreements 
have been effectively suspended. Recruitment has also 
t a k e n place in the past f'rn<n Zambia and Tanzania. The most recent change con-
cerns a labour treaty made with the administration of Transkei. Because this 
latter case is very different from that of internationally acknowledged, in-
dependent states, and is also explicitly regarded on a different level by the 
Chambor of Mines, it should be considered as a special category in discussions 
on the internal labour reserves of South Africa. 
Despite some variations, a number of common principles and points underlie or 
are contained in these international agreements. The major aspects covered 
include: numbers permitted or required to be recruited; (sometimes) 
minimum basic rates applicable; compulsory deferred pay regulations and 
the mode of payment; minimum contract length and definition of options for 
/ t e n s i o n 
extension, w - v conditions for renewal of contract; restrictions on eligible 
recr^itees
 v
ky sex, area, age, nationality etc); liability for transport 
3"iG repatriation; applicable 'eoislation in supplier" and recipient states; 
-ees a-'-, c* taxes; docjrntnt.it ion required by contracting parties; restric-
on r,ccu optional and mobiliry of contract, workers whilst in South 
Africa; ~ en *' e*" a u c t i o n or agreements; and conditions for termination. 
Because agreements nave beet; at different times, subject to various 
economic pressures and legal necessities. and made applicable to differently 
stri.ctL.reci f o r e i g n ) labour . - >••, es, they are not identical. However, 
differences tend to be more the of degree than of kind and in recent 
years tney have tended to become Miidi! er. 
r.'i-' o: : >:
h
'icvo Sr-a tc J 
T
h e BLS states - formerly colonial Protectorates under British control - have 
always had a special status in respect of the entry of their citizens into 
South Africa. This has applied particularly to Lesotho, a micro-state 
completely surrounded by the Republic, from which it has been estimated that 
around 262,000 workers were permanently absorbed into South Africa from 1911-56.
7 
During tne colonial period, informal labour arrangements governed movement 
across the borders of BLS states to South Africa, there having been sub-
stantial independent migration over decades. Subsequently, several private 
recruiters operated in these tcrritories, among them Wenela/NRC, Anglo-
Colliery Recruiting Organisations, the Natal Coal Owners' Labour Association, 
Amalgamated Recruiting Organisation, Theron's Recruiting Corporation and 
Hadley's Bantu Labour Organisation. Since 1958, domiciled workers from BLS 
states have been classified as foreigners and passports/documents have been 
compulsory since 1963-66. Since this date points of entry have been restricted 
to 51 border control points. Subsequently, labour agreements have been 
drawn up with Botswana and Lesotho (but not as yet Swaziland). According to 
Breytenbach, these agreements have rested on established policies of what 
could be called preferential displacement, 1n that whilst South Africa, attemp-
ting 'to reduce the number of non-Republican Bantu as fast as feasible in 
practice
1
, has recognised the special position of BLS workers.
8 
/Today 
Botswana ras a Labcu>- Representative in South Africa and negotiations 
'Sve oeen proceeding towards similar arrangements for other countries. The 
. ,•. - L a o o u r Representative p e r f o m s a variety of roles: the soliciting 
on .o
n
citions conr>vntioo Botswana in the South African labour 
cc r s" de'*a t i on of the welfare and bousing of Batswana migrants in 
:u;
r
" A
f
»*ic?., ".o!no as an authority to ensure that workers comply with 
NO.itor African law-? regarding identification, entry and departure; admini-
stration or referred pay. remittances, taxes and a welfare fund; assisting 
with toe repatriation of i 1 ! , injured or destitute Batswana who are required 
'o >eVvH South Africa; th? provision of liaison functions with employers 
and the Sou;h African governme' r; the provision of liaison functions on 
hehal" of soakers, in respect Workmen's Compensation and Pneumoconiosis 
i a ns . 
Formerly, a large portion of labour supply from BLS states was of a non-
recruited character. While a sizeable element of labour supply is still of 
tnis form, evidence suggests that it has become relatively less important in 
recent years. In other words, contract arrangements have come to be of 
greater relative significance, thereby giving the state and employers in 
South Africa more control over foreign entrants onto the local labour market 
from these sources. Further, it has been the Chamber of Mines, through 
Wenela/NRC, which has controlled a growing share of this increased volume 
of recruited labour supply. Thus, whilst the NRC accounted for 22 percent 
of recruited labour from BLS in 1960, this proportion was 68 percent in 1970.° 
The bulk of non-recruited workers have traditionally fallen into, and continue 
to be employed in, the short-term/casual labour markets in agrarian production, 
notably fnose near BLS borders. 
In all BLS states, recruiting by public authorities and chiefs has now been 
prohibited. Laws dealing with recruitment are similar; however, in Botswana 
and Lesotho (but not in Swaziland) compulsory deferred pay schemes operate. 
Before early 1975, remittances to Lesotho were on a voluntary basis. There-
after 60 percent of each worker's basic rates were compulsorily placed in the 
Lesotho National Bank and were not withdrawable until the expiration of his 
contract. One exclusion operating - resulting from the Department of Bantu 
Administration General Circular Minute 32 of 1966 - has been that no domestic 
workers may be recruited from BLS states.
1 0
 Nor may they work in the Western 
/Cape 
Cape, all such 1 ereign workers in tris area having been subject to forced 
- - s s a l after 25 September 19^4, and repatriation after 6 November 1958. 
rtork.e-s recruited from S o stales a'-e controlled by defined procedures. They 
•-,:,'» ente- Sruth Africa only on a supplementary basis, after the relevant 
;cjti Africa' C"strict Labou-- ?ureaii nas been satisfied that no South African 
vsorKe^s are 3vai . e. At suui a point, it issues approval through a No 
>. This Joes not, however, apply to mines affiliated to 
t^e Chamber ct Mines. Employers must recruit workers themselves, such workers 
ceing restricted to v.-.-?. v : : ;>;i'i , >• devendsnts. Employers must obtain 
consent of the labour Commissioner in the supplier state as well as meet any 
'•oatrred fees due. 
For employment on farms or in non-affiliated mines, the recruiting license 
fee in Botswana is presently set at R2,00 for the recruitment of less than 
!00 farm workers but at R50.00 for the recruitment of 100 or more workers, 
ir. Lesotho, where more short-term employment near the border is involved, 
license fees for recruitment have been set at R5,00 for 30 days (for farm 
workers), and R50.00 per annum for other employment. Swaziland has not 
charged license fees if less than 19 workers are recruited per calendar year. 
In other circumstances, the fee has been seC at R50,00 per annum. 
Advances, recoverable from recruitees, have also been required under law. 
Advances have been used to cover annual basic taxes due and passport fees 
(usually between Rl,00-R2,00 eoch). Non-recoverable payments have also been 
necessary: for an attestation fee (R10,00 in Botswana, R11.50 in Lesotho and 
R1 ,00 in Swaziland), for forward travel costs, for medical examination, and 
rental of workers
1
 accommodation pending departure to South Africa. These 
financial inflows to supplier states have been quite apart from others in 
the form of remittances and recruitment expenditures on staff, equipment and 
stores. 
.V: oijectzen Certificates have not applied to the Chamber of Mines (i.e. 
Wenela/NRC and Anglo Colliery Recruiting Corporation or ACR0L 1n Lesotho) 
in BLS states, for which there has to date existed no restriction on recruit-
ment levels. They may be issued for all mines and all farms in districts 
bordering on, or near, BLS (and Mocambique), provided jobs for local workers 
/are not 
?.re "-wt jecDaraised. Employers bear a liability for accommodation. The 
C e r t i : 3 t e
:
> c o g e n c y in tne "irst instance is six months. Employers under-
take • ,abi'it
;
es "or ^ e p a t r i c f v n and also agree not to re-employ the worker 
{ -ontns -'o; lowing ccotro;i expiration. 
A"
7
 workers 't- • ited private
1
;. o.,v e required a valid passport, a 
travel occu-ient emp 1 oyment record book, a smallpox vaccination, a 
set o
f
 cert'^e-ci fingerprints and a copy of the employment contract as 
attesteo m the supplier state. Recruits must enter from Botswana through 
Ramath 1 ubama, from Swaziland Golela, and from Lesotho through Marseilles, 
rasspo' ts must 31 so be endorsee for the period of work concerned. 
Pre-! 963 arrivals from 3LS, who nave also been in lawful employment, may re-
main in employment (excluding the case of the Cape Province). Such workers 
may cnange employers but restrictions regarding prescribed areas still apply. 
For post-1963 entrants, entry is subject to a maximum of two years at any 
•'me time, passports being so endorsed and employers being required to sign 
the endorsement monthly. This procedure operates as a check against abscond-
ment or evasion of the system of control. 
The labour agreements reached with BLS states have come to have greater 
significance since their proportion of foreign labour supply has risen follow-
ing Malawi's withdrawal in April 1974, and the diminution in Mocambican 
>uoolies in 1976-77. 
' -:*•.' Frorn Colonial Neeebbity to Socialist Pragmatism 
T
he history of active recruitment of Mocambican labour for South African 
employers preaatcs this century, workers initially coming to farms in the 
Eastern Transvaal. The first agreements made by the colonial authorities 
were with private recruiters. 
When Wenela began its operations after 1902, over 80 percent of its first 
recruits were Tonga workers from southern Mocamblque. A 1909 Convention 
regularised and revised arrangements between Wenela and the Portuguese Au-
thorities. Further negotiations took place in 1912, the compulsory deferred 
/'pay scheme 
-10-
n
3
y scheme stemming from this time. Minimum service periods then were 12 
rcv.trs. In 1
J
14 it was decided that, no recruitment could occur north of 
latitude 2 2 South. 
-i-p Mocambiqi.e Convention, formulated in 1928, dealt in one part with rr«ine 
labour export-; t^ South Africa. Under it, Wenela received a recruitment 
monopoly. Compulsory remittances were initially set at 20 percent of cash 
wages, this proportion later being amended to 50 percent of cash wages. The 
Convention together with subsequent amendments, fixed Wenela's annual re-
cruitment - ..• :«.-•: 100,000 ; 1929), falling to 80,000 (1933-35) during the 
Height of the Depression, risir:: to 100,000 (1940-64). Minimum quotas were 
fixed at 6b,GOO. 
In 1964 a new Agreement or Labour Treaty was made with the government of 
Portugal on behalf of its colonial dependency (the Province of Mocambique). 
Additionally, Government Notice No. 2056 of 1939 (repealed 1956) in South 
Africa provided that recruitment in Mocambique was prohibited except for 
affiliated mines. Subsequently, all employers {excluding domestic employers 
and industrialists) could use but not recruit Mocambican workers. Such 
recruitment was carried out by Mocambican recruiters, mostly for Natal and 
Transvaal farms. The South African government has also stipulated general 
labour arrangements for Mocambican workers (as of 1966). 
At least up to independence in 1975, the delegate of the Portuguese Institute 
of Labour acted as labour representative for Mocambique and Angola. This 
functionary's role was to promote the registration of workers, to organise a 
deposit and transfer agency, to monitor conditions of labour and to help 
organise repatriations. In addition, inspectors were stationed in nearly a 
dozen locales. 
Recruits from Mocambique, except those coming through Wenela agencies, have 
since 1966 been subject to controls similar to those that have applied to 
BLS workers since 1963. The major difference has been that all recruitment 
has had to be done by Mocambican recruiters. 
Employers have been required to apply to the Mocambique labour representative 
for labour and to pay designated employment agencies for transport, repatriation 
/fees 
»
S
es arc advances, t
h
ere being Three such agencies in 1974. Charges varied 
strict, transport being c.iqhest for the Porto Amelia District (R77.00) 
%nd lowest
 f
or Soutn of the Save River (R46.00). Repatriation fees were 
••'sc ^iqhes: for Porto An:el ia ;R40,50) and lowest for South of the Save River 
SB,DO . Mr>sf of the latter workers were from Kazai , Inhambane, and Lourenco 
M
arcues (now jute •. Aovances were a standardised R5,00. Additionally, the 
Portuguese autho- 'ties were it be paid registration fees through employment 
acencies: R4.5C for agrirultural labour of contract duration less than 18 
nuntns; F»I ,CC for agricultural employment of less than 12 months; and R1 ,50 
if tne period was less tnan •:. months. The respective charges for similar 
tvie periods, but for non-agr
-1
 l;.<1 tural work, were R6,00» R4.00 and R2,00. 
A M monies had to be paid in escutios in Mocambique. Wenela met its own license 
fees, payable direct to the government. 
Since 1975 the precise extent to which there arrangements and charges might 
have changed is not known. 
Special provisions have applied to Wenela and workers for employment on 
affiliated mines. Contract lengths are specified at 12 months (or 313 shifts: 
a relatively large number). Options for a 6 month extension of contract are 
provided. Tnr. period of contract begins when the worker arrives at the 
point of employment. Contracts had to be registered with the Delegate. 
Persons under 18 years of age, or those unfit, could not be contracted. 
Repatriation is at Wenela's expense if the recruitee is found to be unfit 
before placement and at the mice's expense if afterwards. The provisions of 
the agreement do not apply to workers earning over R80.00 monthly. Provisions 
exist for compensation in the event of occupational injury. Contracts can be 
extended, with approval of both the Delegate and the South African authorities, 
together with payment of a pro rata fee to the employment agency, for a length 
o
c
 time up to a maximum period of 18 months. Failure of workers to perform 
contract entitles employers to a pro rata refund on the registration fee. 
These provisions fell under the 1964 Treaty between Portugal and South Africa 
(itself validated for 5 years). This Treaty also gave Mocambican authorities 
power to limit or stop recruitment in certain zones on economic, social or 
medical grounds. 
/Zimbabwe/Rhodeeia ... 
• ;. - •••:.:•- .\ : ' r Sialic? 
Zi-.Da^we tocs.v occupies a oo'o^c position amongst supplier states. A state 
,sitr a settle-- political and ^oooomio structure, and a former importer of a 
s.jOstant^al
 f
oreior African laoo;J
r
 supply for primary industries from Malawi, 
v aod Za^oia, it has adopted a foreign labour displacement, policy 
• - 195S an.3 no-' receives almost ro new inflows of foreign workers, and 
s
,-
ncc jecembe-- 1974 bas beer: o contract labour supplier for the affiliates 
o* the Cha^br»" of Mines. This new outflow formalises a supply pattern, or 
' a
r
oe"
t
." r.i exodus, which ha- operated from the turn of the twentieth century 
a-ereby migrants have sought e n V y into South Africa through illicit border 
rossincs into the Northern Tra;,svaal - eventually to seek work through 
Messina Transvaal Development Ltd., NRC offices on the southern bank of the 
Limpopo east of Messina, on farms in the Transvaal or in illegal urban-
industrial jobs (notably domestic work) on the Rand. 
bp until late 1974 the state resisted overtures towards contracting into the 
Wenela system but it subsequently--for economic and political reasons -
actively sought such a relationship leading to an agreement on the inter-
national division of labour reserves in Zimbabwe. 
The agreement, which nominally runs for 5 years (with one year's notice 
thereafter on either side) was made In accordance with the provisions of 
trie (Rhodesian) African Labour Regulations Act (1911) and Rhodesian Govern-
nent Notice No. 150 of 1939 bet>./,.en the state and Mine Labour Organisations 
(Wenela) Ltd., acting on behalf of its 55 listed gold mining companies, 
"he South African Bantu Labour Act (1964) and relevant sections of the South 
African Mine and Works Act (1956) apply to these contracts. The agreement 
provided for a minimum of 20,000 workers to be contracted. 
bnder the agreement, workers are transported at Wenela's cost to Johannesburg 
where they must remain until placed in mining employment. The exclusion of 
dependents reduces indirect costs associated with employment. 
Wages are set at minimum rates stipulated in South African currency in the 
agreement. Over-time is paid at more than normal rates and food is provided 
as prescribed by government regulation. Quarters are provided free, though 
co stipulations regarding quality are provided. Hospitalisation costs are 
/borne 
- 1 3 -
rc- by employers. All trat.sport costs fro:
1
! the depots of recruitment to 
vce nines are borne by V.'enele. 
After r e p l e t i o n of contract, should the recruiter not wish to return home, 
c;; •• 'i f-j ~\t may continue for a period not. exceeding a further 6 months but 
only on the mines. One month's notice must. be given if the extra period is 
for less than 6 month?. Thereafter the contractee must return to Zimbabwe -
either to the point of attestation or the nearest Wenela office thereto -
at the- cost of Wenela. After the first three months of work, 60 percent of 
basic rr.tes of pay per shift (of 8 hours) is retained from earnings by the 
employer, it is then paid through Wenela to the contractee in Zimbabwe, the 
monies going into a Post Office Savings Bank account. However, employees may 
agree to Wenela w i Lhhe 1 di ;>g any amount required to liquidate admitted debt:", 
in the Republic. 'Inese forced savings can be considered an eventual source 
of tmr.1 'I-sc^l e accumulation, but during tne contract they typically act as 
an insurance that funds are kept aside for dependents in the country of 
origin. Further, the withholding of earnings by the state emphasise: the 
disadv?ntaged status of workers wh^ effectively do not control receipts from 
the sale of their labour. Desertion, or abr.conduirt, as the Chamber of Mines 
now prefers to call its, thus becon.es an expensive action. 
The completion of contract, which involve-* at least 270 shifts of 'continuous 
underground emnloyp>enL
1
, entitles conttactees to receipt of a certificate 
which, on presentation te any Wenela employer within a period of H monthi 
from the date of discharge, enables the worker to recommence work at the 
basic rate of pay cited on the certificate. Thus the contract provides for 
some wac^ advancement in the case of regular workers who effectively tie 
themselves to mine labour, even though they switch employers. Of the 1,000 
contractus who returned in the first three months of 1976, about half had 
alreedy re-contracted w i Lh We.iela before mid-April. The clauses represent 
an attempt by the industry as a whole to mitigate the y-epuluion effect 
structurally built into contracts by establishing a countervailing, albeit 
mild, attraction effect. 
To some extent, enforced contractual turnover is functional to the supplier 
state. The migrant's return facilitates lump-sum expenditures of accumulated 
savings and helps conserve familial, kinship and social links with dependents 
and others in the reserve economy. In the ca-.c of Zimbabwe, the clause also 
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local employers witn an option to compete for the labourer's services 
?-"te'- ne ",as returned. Tre state also ensures a higher probability that tax 
liabilities are met. The injection of monies into either rural areas or low-
^.come u"-bar, households is f a c i
H
t a t e d , and at probably a much higher level 
t ;an * m i g r n i o r involved a permanent move. In the latter instance, also, 
i'ie supplier srr.te :c: id oe burdened with an even greater cost in terms of 
.arirg for tncse ^r't beh'nd. usually the aged and/or young. 
Or tne nfr.er hand, the South African employer is provided with an opportunity 
to --u: l.-.x workers from vi-e labour force while the recipient state avoids 
social security costs for workt,< and dependents. The regularised turnover 
also bui Ids into mining employment a predictable degree of worker insecurity 
in tnat the latter can never anticipate permanency and security in employment 
oecause workers are forced to oscillate periodically under conditions which 
necessarily require them to become divorced from their families for lengthy 
periods at a time. The agreement itself, upon which the individual's contract 
ultimately depends, is beyond his power to influence. These conditions would 
seem (at least superficially) to suit management. They tend to reduce the 
prospects of successful and sustained collective worker organisation against 
employers. Spontaneous and sporadic upheavals in mine compounds, a common 
feature for many years, would thus appear to express a structural incapacity 
on the part of contractees to negotiate benefits or even influence conditions 
of contract and labour. Any benefits workers might achieve are likely to be 
only temporary in character insofar as the individual is concerned. On a 
subsequent contract the worker may not be able to guarantee return to the 
mine which offers the precise benefit he requires and about which he may have 
previously expressed preferences or even gone on strike, The structure of 
contracts would thus appear to have a major importance which seems to have 
been overlooked in much analysis to date on the question of social control 
over mine workers. These pressures operate independently of the state's 
non-recognition of African unions in South Africa for the purpose of collective 
barga i ni ng. 
The agreement further noted that persons found 'medically unfit' for under-
ground labour may be used for surface work (to which lower wages pertain) or, 
if the employer so desires, the workers can be repatriated at the employer's 
/expense 
expense. The explication of restrictive criteria (concerning age, weight and 
••ealtn; in tne area of origin help reduce the degree of repatriation for 
•^ed'ca
1
 reasons from South Africa. Such policies reduce labour costs and 
-acilitate accumulation in South Africa. 
Employees required to work on every working day, on day or night shift, 
.-o worv o, . ly ;-c<teb, at the employer's option. When called upon, 
worker? must work on a numb™ of specified public holidays and Sundays, 
workers are required to do over-time as and when management decides. These 
aspects of the contract heighten managerial control over the labour process 
nd enable management discretion to be serviced as a priority before employee 
considerations come to bear. 
When . •;" So J prevent a worker from working he is entitled to half pay 
calculated at the average pay earned by him during the previous 3 months, or 
any shorter period worked to that date. In such circumstances, workers may 
be reallocated to jobs for which they did not originally engage and remuneration 
is determined at the rate for the job, not in terms of the rate of pay on 
the worker's original contract. This is provided that the pay is not less 
than the level of half pay stipulated above. This work counts towards the 
fulfillment of contract. In such instances, either party has the option of 
cancellation of the contract. Where employers cancel, the worker is offered 
to other members of Wenela, provided that conditions of service are no worse 
than those previously pertaining. 
Apart from Africans entering South Africa from Zimbabwe under Wenela's charge, 
there have been and remain other Independent migrants entering the Republic. 
In theory, such persons must enter via border posts. In practice, many have 
not. To regularise such past inflows, the South African Department of 
Bantu Affairs and Development (BAD)' has required workers who have been in 
South Africa at least since 1 March 1968 to apply in South Africa for a 
Rhodesian Worker's Travel Document (WTD). They could remain 1n employment 
until 31 August 1969, thereafter having to return to Zimbabwe. The WTD has 
a 5-year validity with a 5-year renewable option. But in order for it to 
become effective the worker had to go to Zimbabwe for one month. Thereafter, 
he could be re-engaged. 
/For legal 
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legal and regularised workers, employers had to pay R20.00 (to cover 
eventual repatriation costs after the second contract of service). The 
f
ee v,as refundable only if there was proof that the workers arrived back 
-H Zimbabwe. Further, re-entry permits may only be issued 'if no indigenous 
labour is available'. 
however, workers who were in illegal employment in South Africa as of March 
1
968 were given permission to take up or remain in employment if in mining 
or agriculture. At the tine, these were low-wage sectors. Other occupational 
categories were permitted in prescribed areas if an urban local authority 
gave explicit permission. For such illegal workers so regularised, contracts 
could not extend beyond 18 months after which repatriation ensued. 
These attempts at regularisation sought to expose illegal Zimbabwean workers 
and eventually set in motion processes of displacement. They were not wholly 
successful, workers (and in some cases employers) seeking to avoid detection. 
Thus in April 1976 another regularlsation exercise was conducted. 
The 1976 'legalisation of Rhodesian male Bantu' was based on a labour agreement 
with the Rhodesian Ministry of Labour. Persons illegally employed in South 
Africa, but excluding the Western Cape, (as of 1 April 1976) had 6 weeks up 
until 15 May 1976 'to legalise their position and to become registered for 
employment'. Those workers employed outside of prescribed areas were not 
allowed to become registered for prescribed areas. Occupational categories 
permitted were: domestic labour, waiters in licensed restaurants, hotel jobs, 
farming and mining. The new agreement excluded independent contractors or 
daily labourers working on their own account, who could nonetheless register 
for legalised work. However, it allowed for those in gaol under the Bantu 
(Urban Areas) Act No. 25 of 1945 or the Bantu Labour Act No. 67 of 1964 or 
under the Admission of Persons to the Republic Regulations Act No. 59 of 1972, 
and others awaiting repatriation, to take up legal work provided they had no 
serious criminal convictions. Once again, as in 1968, a TWD was required -
valid for 5 years with an option for a further 5 years renewal. But employers 
were required to pay labour bureaux 'all outstanding registration/contribution 
fees'. This could amount to quite a sum in retrospective liabilities. Further 
a non-refundable repatriation fee of R50.00 was now needed (except in the cases 
of employers who had met the R20.00 requirement of the 1968 regularisation and 
/for farmers 
r
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a m e r s in non-prescribed areas). And, whenever the worker sought new 
employment, tne sarre fees were required of the new employer. This provision, 
to the extent it is implemented, would have the effect of taxing employers 
o* legalisea Zimbabwean Africans, thereby encouraging their more rapid 
oispiacement. 
"he agreement a U o introduced a compulsory remittance scheme for all non-Wenela 
recruitees or legalised Africans from Zimbabwe already inside South Africa. 
If workers received below R30,00 monthly in wages, RIO,00 was to be deferred 
montnly; for wage ranges R31 .00-R40.00 it was R15,00; for R41,00-R50,00 it 
was 320,00; and so on, up to Rl00,00 remittance for a wage range of R141,00-
R1 50,00. In the case of wages received in excess of R151,00 the remittance 
was 66 percent. These extremely onerous conditions have made legalisation 
unoesired by many workers, especially those who have been in South Africa for 
years, or whc have families in South Africa, or who have lost contact with 
their home districts. 
Workers entering South Africa illegally after 1 April 1976 are now prosecuted 
and repatriated. Their employers, where they are found in illegal employment, 
also face 'steps against them'. This threat Implies initially a refusal to 
"issue further No Objection Certificates, but may eventually mean prosecution. 
The net effect of the new agreement with Zimbabwe is to subject Illegal 
Africans to a bureaucratic control designed to Implement displacement, inflict 
penalties on non-compliant employers, restrict occupational mobility to low-
wage or designated sectors for which foreign labour may be used, ensure that 
legalised workers remit monies home, and in consequence make the Wenela 
contract agreement the most prominent form of labour supply arrangement be-
tween the two countries. 
!4ulawi: The Experiment of Unilateral Withdrawal under a Conservatice 
Eqok ic Policy 
The origins of Malawi's formal supplier state status stem from 1938, following 
a 1936 agreement, when Wenela began recruitment for 12-month contracts from 
the Southern Province. Up to 1947 Wenela had a recruiting monopoly in 
Malawi. Since April 1974, however, Malawian contract labour has been syste-
matically withdrawn from South Africa on Dr Banda's and (subsequently) the 
/Malawi ... 
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Malawi Congress Party's explicit instruction. This exercise remains a unique 
experiment in (relatively sudden and unplanned) supplier state withdrawal -
providing some lessons for other supplier states contemplating a re-defined 
relationship with South Africa. 
Because Malawi could easily, or may have to in the short-term, re-contract 
with South Africa, it is necessary to consider the character of its past 
labour supply pattern to South Africa. There it little doubt that a legali-
sation of Wenela's operations in Malawi could in a short period lead to,at 
least an inflow level of 20-25,000 workers. The re-entry of Malawi could 
also potentially preface that country's return to a supplier status vis-a-vis 
Zimbabwe, through the historical link with the Rhodesian African Labour Supply 
Commission. 
The latest Wenela/Malawi government agreement was signed on 1 November 1965 
whilst a Malawi/South African inter-state labour agreement stems from 10 May 
1967. Under the 1965 agreement active recruitment in Malawi was stopped, 
workers thereafter voluntarily presenting themselves at depots for attestation, 
sometimes with the assistance of the Employment Services Division of the 
Malawian Government. 
The Wenela/Malawi agreement provided for Malawi to deliver contractees to 
South Africa, a move which greatly assisted the finances of Air Malawi. 
Wenela's supply was restricted to men over 18 years of age. The agreement 
also restricted access to persons of non-Malawian origins, e.g. many 
Tanzanians and Zambians or northern Mocambicans who legally or illegally 
entered Malawi to contract with Wenela. Contracts were restricted to a 2-
year maximum, though the basic minimum contract was for 18 months. Workers 
had to have passports (R6,00 each). Free of charge, Wenela also provided 
a medical examination at the end of service, transport to the place of 
residence, clothing for work, an advance for the cost of passports and for 
one blanket (and other clothing), a guide/interpreter en route, means for 
the deduction of Malawian taxes and levies owing to local authorities inside 
Malawi, and means for the sending of remittances (R8,00 after 6 months, there-
after 60 percent of monthly earnings - all to be paid immediately after 
return to Malawi). In addition, Wenela paid a 50 cent attestation fee and a 
10 cent fee for each recruit in respect of each month's service in South 
/Africa 
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Africa. On top of this set of current charges, Wenela outlayed a fixed sum 
of R240,000 per calendar year for 20,000 recruits, the amount being reduced 
pro rata for any lower figure. For higher numbers, the Malawian Government 
received R6,00 for each additional worker recruited above the 20,0U0 level. 
The agreement was subject to 12 month's notice by either party. 
The Wenela/Malawi agreement was amended in 196/. Significantly, it provided 
for the South African Government to terminate contracts with 12 months' 
notice 'if indigenous labour (was) available', provided also that (other) 
existing contracts be honoured. 
The 1967 South African/Maiawian agreement covered a wide range of issues. 
These included the requirement that Malawians entering South Africa have a 
passport and a separate Employment Record Book (R0,b0 each). It also 
made arrangements for other workers not in employment with Wenela on 
affiliated mines. It divided the latter group into four categories - A , 
B, C and '0. 
Category A - long time workers in South Africa - could visit Malawi periodically 
while their residence permits for South Africa were to be revised on a 5-year 
basis. Their repatriation became suspended. They could never obtain South 
African citizenship, work in the Western Cape or take up domestic employment 
anywhere in South Africa. These workers also paid taxes to the South African 
Government. 
Category B workers were those authorised to work for a specific period and 
purpose. Contracts would normally be of a 2-year duration but cuuld upon 
South African approval be extended for further periods. When contracts ex-
pired for those in employment as of 1 October 196/., workers: would be repat-
riated if contracts were not renewed. Where renewed, workers would have to 
spend 6 months in Malawi, employers would have to review contracts by paying 
a fee (of around R39,00) and there would have to be no indigenous labour for 
the job. Such workers could not work in the Western Cape or as domestic 
workers. 
Category C covered illegal workers as of 1 October 1967. They could stay 
on in (urban) prescribed areas only if labour bureaux agreed, and then only 
/for a period 
i 
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for a period of 2 years. If permission was refused, they could work for the 
same duration in a non-prescribed (rural) area. Failing this, repatriation 
ensued, the liability falling on employers, in respect of both workers and 
dependents. 
Category D covered illegal entrants after October 1967. For this group, 
immediate repatriation was planned. 
The 1967 agreement also covered fees payable to the Malawi an Government 
Labour Representative. Medical requirements were stipulated for entry. 
Further, absconders who were two-time offenders faced repatriation (the 
cost of which was recoverable from wages) and permanent exclusion from ever 
entering South Africa again. The worker was black-listed for future employ-
ment. Repatriated persons were also forbidden further entry. Employers of 
illegal Malawians were to bear the costs of repatriation. Malawians were 
prohibited from seeking work in South Africa on their own initiative. 
Deferred pay was to be deducted as per contract. The Malawian Labour Repre-
sentative would look after the interests of Malawians (in a fashion similar 
to other representatives). The agreement ran until 1 August 1972. There-
after it was to be automatically extended on an annual basis, subject to 
notice. 
Angola: The Latecomer and Early Leaver 
Angola, under Portuguese domination, was never a significant supplier state 
for South Africa. Since independence in 1975, the prospect of it becoming so 
has receded, although in that year 3000 Angolan workers were employed on 
affiliated mines (following ari agreement which took effect on 1 January 1973), 
and possibly others were employed elsewhere. In 1970, the Census recorded 7000 
Angolans in employment in South Africa. However, Angolans have regularly 
migrated across the Namibian border to take work in that country. These 
movements, as also those to Zambia, have been much reduced of late, following 
the onset of civil war in Angola in 1961. 
Prior to independence, workers from the Province of Angola contracted outside 
the country under the Portuguese Native Labour Code of 1928 (amended by the 
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Angolan Ordinance 2797 of 1956). Such controls regulated recruitment inside 
Angola also - through the South West African Native Labour Association 
(SWANLA), which recruited around 15-20,000 contractees for work in Namibia 
(during the 1960s).
1 2 
Special provisions apply to Angolan workers in South Africa. Contracts may 
not exceed 12 months but can be extended for a further 6 months. Once con-
tract has been terminated, the worker may not be again employed (in South 
Africa or in Namibia) for at least 6 months from the date of termination. 
Employers must apply for permission to recruit Angolans (through, prior to 
1975, the Employment Service of Angola). Fees are levied. Deferred pay 
(at 60 percent of net earnings) is to be provided for in contracts. No 
other deductions for advances were permitted. Angolans were precluded from 
working in the Eastern or Western Caprivi Strip. 
Namibia/South West Africa: Foreign State With a Disputed Statue 
There is no agreement between Namibia and South Africa regarding migrancy or 
recruitment. In general, Namiblans may not enter South Africa, though in 
1970 there were a number of Namibians in employment in South Africa. Con-
ditions might, however, be expected to alter after independence. 
Zambia: Prospective Supplier? 
Recruitment from South Africa began in 1938 through Wenela in the Western 
Provinces under a quota arrangement in respect of 12-month contracts 
(extendable for a further 6 months). Wenela enjoyed a recruitment monopoly 
in Zambia in the colonial period, though many Zambians went south indepen-
dently to South Africa or Southern Rhodesia, notably up to 1958 on the 
ulere travel service organised by the Southern Rhodesian state on behalf 
of its employers. 
Following independence on 1 October 1964, President Kaunda prohibited all 
Zambians from working in South Africa. Prohibitions on working in Zimbabwe 
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followed UDI in that country. This mostly affected Barotseland (Western 
Province), the labour reserve which had been the focus of Wenela's recruit-
ment efforts. However, in 1976, following disturbances in Western Province 
and agitation amongst some M.P.s in the Zambian Parliament, calls were again 
made for the re-cortracting back into the South African labour- supply system. 
It is also believed that advisers may have recommended such a policy to the 
Zambian government. Wenela, aware of the prospect and desirous of maximising 
the number of supplier states, has alway kept this possibility in mind. 
However, with generalised labour surpluses in South Africa and adjacent 
supplier states, its need for Zambian labour must be regarded as marginal 
at best. 
Tanzania 
Tanzania^ workers have often in the past left the country to go to Zambia, 
Malawi or Zimbabwe as well as South Africa for work. Since i967 a pro-
hibition has existed on Tar.zanians seeking work in South Africa. In 1960, 
there were 18,000 Tanzanians working in the country. The numbers have fallen 
since this date. At present, it appears most unlikely, if only for political 
reasons, that an inter-state contract could be made between South Africa and 
Tanzania. The growth of labour surpluses in closer proximity to South 
Africa also makes this improbable. 
Transkei/Bophuthatswana 
The forced balkanisation of South Africa) is also leading to the creation of 
incipient states, the status and legitmacy of which is internationally dis-
puted. However, fur the purposes of labour supply to South Africa they will 
probably come to assume a special position. Such areas as the Transkei have 
a"
1
 ready been given special prominence in the labour demand strategy of the 
Chamber of Mines. Furthermore, a labour treaty has been made between Transkei 
and South Africa. A further one might be expected when Bophuthatswana becomes 
independent in Dtcjember 1977. 
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CONDITIONAL ELEMENTS DEFINING POLICY 
Although for the most part, policy on contracts operates with a focus on a 
specific state, these policies are articulated with one another in response 
to basic socioeconomic requirements. As shown earlier, a general policy of 
extending control over foreign African workers has characterised the 1960-77 
period. For effective functioning, these broad inter-state contracts and 
policies have required conditioning by other elements of the legal/contractual/ 
administrative package. Brief comments are made on some of these elements 
in this section. 
Foreign Africans Employed by Diplomatic Missions 
Diplomatic missions may recruit and employ domestic workers from outside South 
Africa, but only in the case of accredited personnel. There must be no ob-
jection to the person employed. Such workers may be re-employed by other 
diplomats, provided application for a change in employment status is approved. 
These provisions exclude the employment of foreign African women. 
Self-Employed Foreign Africans and Traders 
The express objective of policy is to restrict foreign Africans to a formal 
job status. Very few qualify, or are permitted, to trade on their own account. 
As a result, the petty production sector, to the extent that it exists, is 
almost wholly rooted in the local population. The inflow of foreign Africans 
is thus almost entirely a movement of workers. 
Repatriation 
Employers are liable for repatriation fees in the case of all foreign employees 
except (a) those from BLS states, (b) contractees introduced under agreements, 
(c) lawfully employed Africans from Malawi (except category B Malawians), Mo-
cambique and Angola, and (d) those persons for whom repatriation has been 
suspended. Repatriation fees are non-refundable but can be reclaimed, except 
in the case of Mocambican workers, from the wages of workers being repatriated. 
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Various classes of worker may obtain suspension from repatriation on a five-
yearly basis, viz. nationals from Malawi, Mocambique and Zimbabwe who can 
prove that they have been continuously employed in South Africa, and Angolans 
who have been continuously employed by more than one employer since 1953 or 
one employer since 1958. Such provisions promote a form of labour stability 
within the migrant system. Those so suspended may change employment, but 
only if they do so legally and if the new employer pays the repatriation fee. 
Since various dates, entry, except under agreement or with proper documentation 
by specified nationals, has been made subject to immediate repatriation: BLS 
states (1 July 1963); Mocambique (1 July 1966); Malawi (1 November 1967); 
Zimbabwe (1 March 1968); and Angola (1 January 1974). These restrictions 
reflect the labour conditions and surpluses of labour in South Africa as they 
have changed since 1960. 
Repatriation routes have been clearly established along with procedures for 
repatriation. 
Control of System Deficiencies 
In order to control the system effectively, periodic reviews of conditions have 
been necessary. Legislation has been updated and loopholes closed or watched. 
The Froneman Committee also considered 'the problems of deficiencies in the 
system'. Implicitly, it recommended further control over private recruiters, 
special controls over 'Protectorate' Africans (those from (BLS states) and 
a more pervasive control of clandestine labour. 
The Froneman Committee also pointed to desertion as a loophole for workers to 
obtain illegal entry into non-mining jobs. Undoubtedly, some inter-sectoral 
mobility of this sort has taken place. Some of these absconders are traced 
by the Central Bantu Reference Bureau, extensive documentation controls and 
monitoring being used for this task. 
Greater controls have thus been put on deportation and repatriation, especially 
to prevent such persons re-entering South Africa, either before or after 
departure. 
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The growth of labour bureaux and their focus on urban areas has also brought 
about greater control over foreigners in these areas. It is now difficult 
for foreign Africans to take urban jobs illegally. It is likely to become 
more so in the future. 
Privileges 
Foreign workers suffer various disabilities compared to local workers, even 
though for the latter these may not amount to much (e.g. in the case of access 
to Unemployment Insurance Fund benefits). 
Some foreign workers have, however, obtained urban housing facilities. In 
some areas, foreign workers have been able to obtain some schooling for their 
children (around 13,338, as calculated for 1960 by the Froneman Committee). 
In general, however, substantial disabilities have affected foreign migrants 
primarily because they have been denied the right to bring their families with 
them and hence obtain the benefits to which citizens have had some access. 
Constraints on Withdrawals 
Most agreements provide conditions for contract termination. In theory, these 
cannot be unilaterally abrogated. In practice, however, legal niceties seldom 
prevail (and did not do so in the Malawian case in 1974), Thus withdrawal is 
more likely to be a function of socioeconomic or political conditions. Given 
present trends, however, it is now more the case that foreign African labour 
is being phased out by employers and the state in South Africa itself. Thus, 
to speak of withdrawal in these conditions is different in character from 
such withdrawal as understood (say) in the mid-1960s. 
CONCLUSIONS 
It is not really necessary today that legislation be fundamentally altered 
in order to displace foreign African workers. This has for the most part 
/been done 
been done already. Nonetheless, certain changes in stringency might be expected 
to be introduced, as South Africa continues to apply its policy of phasing-out 
dependence on foreign labour. In the application of this policy, it is 
also likely to mount direct action against offending employers in order to 
make the latter conform with state requirements. 
Analysis of the character of policy change over the last 15 years clearly 
i 
indicates the direction involved and points to the longer-term objectives 
of the state in South Africa, viz. the internalisation of the labour reserves. 
i •.. > 
It may be that such a process will take a number of years. At the same 
time, it is probably that a residual demand for (certain) foreign African 
workers will exist even when the process is far advanced. However, tKe 
volume of such demand is unlikely to be anything like what it has beerinn 
the past. 
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